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THE PLEDGE AS SACRED POLITICAL RITUAL
Sheldon H. Nahmod*
INTRODUCTION
The public and the media, along with Congress, reacted with outrage and
disbelief to the Ninth Circuit's 2002 decision in Newdow v. United States
Congress.' In its initial version, Newdow broadly held that the inclusion in the
Pledge of Allegiance of the phrase "one Nation under God' 2 violated the
Establishment Clause? Members of Congress demonstrated their displeasure by
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance on the steps of the Capitol. Many inveighed, yet
again, against a liberal federal judiciary that not only bore an anti-religious bias, but
also had reached out to decide an inflammatory constitutional issue better left to the
* Copyright 2004. Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B.,
University of Chicago; J.D., Harvard Law School; LL.M., Harvard Law School; M.A.
Religious Studies, University of Chicago Divinity School.
' 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (ruling that the phrase "under God" in the Pledge
violates the Establishment Clause under the endorsement test, the Lemon test, and the
coercion test), as amended, 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003) (limiting analysis to the coercion
test and ruling that, on this basis, the current Pledge of Allegiance violates the Establishment
Clause in public schools and denying rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 962 (2003),
and cert. granted in part sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945
(2003), and rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (finding that the plaintiff did not have prudential
standing).
2 The Pledge was first codified by Congress in 1942 and read as follows: "I pledge
allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands,
one Nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." 36 U.S.C. § 172 (Supp. 11 1942).
Congress amended the Pledge, and added the words "under God" after the word "Nation"
so that it now reads as follows: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of
America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with
liberty and justice for all." 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
3 Newdow, 292 F.3d at 600. As noted more fully later, the Ninth Circuit amended its
decision, limiting it to the public school setting, Newdow, 328 F.3d at 486-90, and thereafter
the Supreme Court, per Justice Stevens, reversed and held in a five-three decision (Justice
Scalia had recused himself) that the plaintiff did not have prudential standing. 124 S. Ct.
2301 (2004). The majority did not address the merits. Id. at 2301-12. However, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas concurred in the judgment. Id. at 2312-33
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). They determined that the plaintiff had prudential standing but
argued on the merits that the phrase "under God" did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Id. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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political process. The country had seen nothing like it since the Supreme Court's
flag desecration decision in Texas v. Johnson4 twelve years earlier. Indeed,
Newdow was considered by many to be an even more unpalatable decision than
Johnson because, in addition to the flag, public school children and God were
involved.
Newdow and the reaction to the decision call attention to the significant role in
the American political community of the Pledge as a sacred5 political ritual, one that
is an important component of American civil religion.6 The Pledge reinforces
patriotic myths, it organizes individuals into a political community, and it
communicates values that provide individuals with important aspects of their sense
of reality. As an exegesis of the Pledge demonstrates,7 the inclusion of the phrase
4 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that under the First Amendment, the government cannot
prohibit the politically motivated burning or other "desecration" of the American flag).
' The distinction between the sacred and the non-sacred appeared several millenia ago
in Western religion. Even though it did not originate with Judaism, the Pentateuch repeatedly
emphasizes the distinction between "Koh'desh" (the sacred or holy) and "Chol" (the non-
sacred or non-holy) in connection, for example, with the Israelites (the "holy people") and
the land of Israel (the "holy land"). The concept of the sacred has been carried over into
Christianity, but it was not until the twentieth century that it became important in the
comparative study of religions. See RUDOLF OTrO, THE IDEA OFTHE HOLY: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE NON-RATIONAL FACTOR IN THE IDEA OF THE DIVINE AND ITS RELATION TO THE RATIONAL
(John W. Harvey trans., Oxford University press 3d impression, 1925) (1917). Theologian
Mircea Eliade, in an influential book, focuses on the concept of the sacred with its aspects
of awe and separateness, and articulates a comprehensive theory regarding religion. MIRCEA
ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION (Willard R. Trask trans.,
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1959). In particular, he demonstrates the ways that humanity
divides time, space, and matter into two realms of the sacred and the non-sacred, or the holy
and the non-holy. See id. at 14-16. A key insight in his description of the ways in which the
sacred manifests itself in human life, or hierophany, is that the sacred literally makes itself
seen. Id. at 11. He concludes his book by examining the presence of the sacred in modern
life, maintaining that the modern individual is still surrounded by the sacred and by ritual, as
reflected in political parties, the occult, and various philosophical movements. Id. at 201-13.
6 The term "civil religion" may have originated in JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT bk. 4, ch. 8 (Henry J. Tozer trans.,
1948) (1895), and was introduced into American political thought in 1967 by Robert Bellah,
in his influential essay, Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1 (1967).
According to Bellah, civil religion is a set of beliefs and attitudes that explains the meaning
and purposes of a political society in terms of a transcendent spiritual reality. Id. at 5-9.
These beliefs and attitudes are held by people generally and are expressed in public rituals,
myths, and symbols. Id. at 8. American civil religion events such as the Revolution, the Civil
War, the deaths of Presidents Lincoln and Kennedy, and the World Wars have Biblical
analogues in the Exodus, the Chosen People, the Promised Land, and Sacrificial Death and
Rebirth. Id. at 16-19. See AMERICAN CtvIL RELIGION (Russel E. Richey & Donald G. Jones
eds., 1974) (containing essays on civil religion); discussion infra Part II.
7 See discussion infra Part II.A.
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"under God" expressly renders God foundational to the American political
community and thereby sacralizes the Pledge in violation of the Establishment
Clause. Nevertheless, the Pledge functioned as a powerful political ritual long
before "under God" was inserted, and would do so even if the phrase were
eliminated from the Pledge on Establishment Clause grounds.
In Part I of this Article, which primarily relies on the work of David Kertzer,8
I first consider ritual in general - defined "as symbolic behavior that is socially
standardized and repetitive"9 - and then political rituals in particular. In Part II,
which is the core of this Article, I engage in an exegesis of the Pledge and analyze
it as a sacred political ritual. Parts III and IV address the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Newdow and the Establishment Clause issues presented. Part Ill briefly sets out
the constitutional background of the Pledge, ° which includes the Supreme Court's
decision in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette" and the Court's school
prayer decisions. 2 Part IV discusses Newdow and argues that the Ninth Circuit got
it right on the Establishment Clause issue, even though the Supreme Court later
reversed on prudential standing grounds. 3
I. POLITICAL RITUALS
A. Ritual in General
Catherine Bell 4 suggests that three general theoretical perspectives, singly or
in combination, have characterized the study of ritual. 5 The first perspective
emphasizes religion and focuses on the origins of ritual and the connections
8 DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, PoLITcs, AND POWER (1988). See discussion infra Part
I (addressing the characteristics of political rituals).
9 See KERTZER, supra note 8, at 9 (defining "ritual").
l0 Whenever the term "Pledge" is referred to, it includes the salute to the flag where the
right hand is placed on the left breast while the language of the Pledge is recited.
" 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
12 These decisions include those dealing with extracurricular activities such as
graduations and football games. See discussion infra Part III.
13 Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). See discussion infra Part IV.
4 I learned much from the excellent survey of the study of ritual in CATHERINE BELL,
RrruAL: PERSPECTIVES AND DIMENSIONS (1997).
'" Id. at 2. As mentioned earlier, I use Kertzer's definition of ritual "as symbolic behavior
that is socially standardized and repetitive." KERTZER, supra note 8, at 9. Kertzer notes that
his definition does not "distinguish between religious and secular ritual," a point that is
important not only for his political ritual project but also for this Article. Id. Along similar
lines, Bell identifies several characteristics of ritual-like activities: "formalism, traditionalism,
disciplined invariance, rule-governance, sacral symbolism and performance." BELL, supra
note 14, at 138.
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between the thing said, myth, and the thing done, ritual.' 6  The second, or
functionalist perspective, focuses on how ritual works, that is, its role in social
organization and the dynamics of human societies.' 7 In contrast, the third, or
culturalist perspective, asks what ritual means and looks at ritual as a form of
cultural connection "that transmits cognitive categories and dispositions that
provide people with important aspects of their sense of reality."'1
8
16 See BELL, supra note 14, at 3-22. I address the mythic aspects of the Pledge later in
my exegesis, particularly the references to "one Nation under God" and "with liberty and
justice for all." See discussion infra Part II. Mircea Eliade's phenomenological study of
religion, the dependence of ritual on myth, and the various psychoanalytic theories of ritual,
ELIADE, supra note 5, and Joseph Campbell's work on myth and ritual, BELL, supra note 14,
at 16, are good examples of this perspective.
It should be emphasized that none of these perspectives invariably stands apart from the
others. Forexample, Joseph Campbell's approach describes four functions of myth and ritual,
some of which are similar to the second and third perspectives set out in the text. Id. Thus,
while ritual for Campbell has a "mystical function that induces a sense of awe" and a
cosmological function of promoting "a coherent image of the cosmos," id., Campbell's
approach also has a sociological function of integrating individuals within the community and
a psychological function of guiding an individual's psychological development, id.
Interestingly, Bell declares that much of the theory underlying these perspectives has been
discredited but concedes that it is still influential. Id. at 22.
17 See BELL, supra note 14, at 23-60. I address the Pledge from a functionalist
perspective later, particularly in connection with its setting in a public education context
involving children. See discussion infra Part II.
This functionalist approach is sociological in nature, as reflected in the seminal work of
Emile Durkheim who studied religion as a social phenomenon. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE
ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE (Joseph Ward Swain trans., The Free Press
1965) (1915). For Durkheim, rituals, defined as rules of conduct in the presence of sacred
objects, help promote the feeling of connection to something larger. BELL, supra note 14, at
24. Later anthropologists engaged in neo-functional systems analysis and emphasized that
human behavior is determined by more than social conditioning. Id. at 29-33. These
anthropologists described the interaction of multiple cultural systems and developed what
Bell terms ecological, ethological, biogenetic, and psychological theories of ritual. Id. at 32.
And, in what Bell calls an important move, structuralism shifted attention from the role of
ritual in religion to a more general category of social action. See id. at 33-46. Claude Lvi-
Strauss, for example, treated all social phenomena, including ritual, as symbolic systems of
communication that are derived from and shaped "by structures of thought rooted in the
human brain." Id. at 42-43. In general, according to Bell, under this second perspective ritual
is non-rational and non-utilitarian. See generally id.
18 BELL, supra note 14, at 2. While the functionalist perspective links symbols to social
organizations, the culturalist perspective emphasizes social and cultural change as well as the
arbitrary and language-like nature of a cultural system of symbols. Id. at 61. Under this
perspective, according to Bell's description, ritual is a means by which the cultural system
and the social system interact with one another. Id. at 2.
Prominent among culturalists is Clifford Geertz who, in his "extensive treatment of
ritual," asserted that religious symbols and religious rituals "constitute a system of values that
[Vol. 13:771
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Bell maintains that no one perspective is superior to the others and that each of
the three perspectives can still be found in ritual studies today. 9 She then
elaborates on her own preference, one that is similar to the culturalist perspective:
ritual is, and should be studied as, a form of cultural practice.2 ° This entails the
following: (1) ritual should be studied in its real context; (2) the central quality of
ritual is the body moving in a specially constructed space, simultaneously imposing
and receiving the values ordering the environment; and (3) ritualization is a form
of acting that tends to promote the authority of forces deemed to derive from
beyond the immediate situation.2 Bell argues that this approach has the advantage
of focusing on what people do and how they do it, rather than on any overarching
theory of ritual.22
Political rituals, 23 addressed next, are a special category of ritual that has been
carefully examined by David Kertzer.24
B. Political Rituals
Bell observes that anthropologists who study political rituals have determined
that such rituals generally "construct, display and promote the power of political
acts both as 'a model of the way things actually are and as 'a model for' how they should
be." Id. at 66 (quoting CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 112 (1973)).
For Geertz and others, ritual functions to display social passions. Moreover, ritual is not
invariably conduct: words alone can be performative utterances that constitute deeds, or
speech acts. Bell explains that various theories of ritual performance became prominent in
the 1970s, followed by an emphasis on human action as praxis. Id. at 72-73. Such "practice
theory" studies how human activities, including rituals, are creative strategies through which
people reproduce and reshape their social and cultural environments. Id. at 73.
Interestingly, Bell identifies what she calls a new paradigm of ritual as "primarily a
medium of expression, a special type of language suited to what it is there to express, namely,
internal spiritual-emotional resources tied to our true identities but frequently unknown and
undeveloped." Id. at 241. She argues that the social forces underlying this ongoing shift
toward self-centered ritual include the media, tourism, and multi-culturalism. Id. at 242-51.
19 She points out that there are other perspectives outside of the three, including feminist
analyses and liturgical studies conducted from within religious traditions. BELL, supra note
14, at 89.
20 Id. at 82.
21 Id. at 81-82.
22 For Bell, ritual is practice that makes and harbors cultural patterns, and doesn't just
express these patterns; it is "a vehicle for the construction of relationships of authority and
submission." Id. at 82.
23 Bell identifies what she calls six fairly standard ritual genres, of which political rituals
are one such genre. She explains her typologies as compromises between completeness and
simplicity. These genres are: (1) "life-cycle" rites of passage; (2) "calendrical and com-
memorative rites"; (3) "rites of exchange and communication"; (4) "rites of affliction"; (5)
"rites of feasting, fasting and festivals"; and (6) "political rituals." Id. at 94.
24 See KERTZER, supra note 8.
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institutions... or the political interests of [particular] constituencies."25 Political
rituals construct power by showing "people as a coherent and ordered community
based on shared values and goals" and by "demonstrat[ing] the legitimacy of th[o] se
values and goals."26 David Kertzer, whose work on political rituals is quite com-
prehensive, makes a similar point somewhat differently - political rituals create
political reality by building political organizations, creating political legitimacy,
"creating political solidarity in the absence of political consensus," and molding
people's understandings of the political universe. 27  For Kertzer and others,
therefore, political rituals do far more than support the political status quo; they
can also create political power.
According to Kertzer,28 symbols are the means "by which we give meaning to
the world around us"; 29 they "instigate social action and define [an] individual's
sense of self."3 "Ritual[s] help[] give meaning to [the] world ... by linking the
past to the present and the present to the future," thereby providing continuity both
individually and to the world.3 1 'They also furnish the means by which people
make sense of the political process. 32 In Kertzer's view, "modem politics depends
on people's tendency to reify political institutions."33 "Each society has its own
mythology detailing its origins and sanctifying its norms,"' and "ritual practices are
2 BELL, supra note 14, at 128.
26 Id. at 129. Specific examples of political rituals in the United States include the State
of the Union Address, Presidential funerals (most recently, that of Ronald Reagan), elections,
Fourth of July celebrations, the singing of the National Anthem at sporting and other events,
and, of course, the Pledge of Allegiance.
27 KERTZER, supra note 8, at 14 (summarizing chapters 2-5 of his book).
28 Kertzer probably fits into the culturalist category.
29 Id. at 3-5.
30 Id. at 6.
31 Id. at 9-10.
32 Id. at 6.
33 Id.
4 Id. at 12. According to important thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche and Mircea Eliade,
myths are necessary for individuals and the societies in which they live because they supply
meaning for them as well as provide an emotional connection for individuals as members of
a political community. See ALLAN MEGILL, PROPHETS OF EXTREMrrY: NIETZSCHE,
HEIDEGGER, FOUCAULT, DERRIDA 75 (1985) (quoting FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, THE
BIRTH OF TRAGEDY 135 (Douglas Smith trans., Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2000) (1887)
(declaring that myths are a central and indispensable element of culture)); ELIADE, supra note
5, at 205 (1957) ("A whole volume could well be written on the myths of modem man, on
the mythologies camouflaged in the plays that he enjoys, in the books that he reads.").
Long before these thinkers, Plato recognized the function of myth when he argued that
only those myths that served the purposes of the political community should be permitted in
the republic by the philosopher-kings. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO bk. III (Francis MacDonald
Cornford trans., Oxford University Press 1942).
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a major means of propagating these political myths."3 Political rituals work
because they have both a "cognitive effect on people's definition of political
reality" and an emotional impact resulting from the satisfaction that people get from
participating in them.36
Kertzer inquires into several areas that are relevant to the Pledge of Allegiance:
political legitimacy, political solidarity, and the molding of "people's understanding
of the political universe."37 A political system that is viewed as illegitimate is
unstable, so political rituals help to make people conform by making them believe
that the society in which they live is legitimate and reflects how the world should
be constructed."S In addition, every society has its legitimating myths; in dem-
ocratic countries, according to Kertzer, that myth is often equality.3
Building on Durkheim, Kertzer points out that political rituals "not only express
innate strivings for social solidarity, but also do much to build and renew them."'
For example, the rituals of American civil religion4' produce solidarity in situations
of conflict. Moreover, uniformity of belief is not required for participation in
political rituals because of the inherent ambiguity of many such rituals.4" For
Kertzer, this turns out to be very important for building social solidarity: political
rituals build solidarity of beliefs through people acting together without necessarily
sharing the same beliefs.43
Finally, and of special importance in connection with the Pledge, for Kertzer,
political rituals not only build solidarity but are an important means of influencing
people's political ideas and values." To show how this happens, he delves into
cognitive psychology45 and focuses on the view that information that comes
35 KERTZER, supra note 8, at 13.
36 Id. at 14.
37 Id.
" For example, an important ritual of legitimation in democracies is the election. Id. at
50-51.
9 Id. at 5 1.
40 Id. at 62.
4' As noted earlier, supra note 6, American politics and the American political system
have been viewed by some scholars as modeled on religion, with many of the characteristics
of the American political system deemed semi-religious in nature and thus reflective of
American civil religion. For example, Bennett considers the components of American civil
religion to include both the existence of a divinity that is non-sectarian and instrumental, and
a "generalized dogma or political ethos" that is transcendent. W. Lance Bennett, Political
Sanctification: The Civil Religion and American Politics, 14 Soc. ScI. INFO. 79, 87
(Nov.-Dec. 1975). Overall, there is a consensus on general principles among adherents to
American civil religion. Id. at 82.
42 KERTZER, supra note 8, at 76.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 76-79.
45 See id. at 79 (relying on various psychological studies).
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"through our senses is 'processed' through 'pre-existing systems of schematized and
abstracted knowledge' structures that are termed "schemas. 46 In addition to
schematic thinking, Kertzer points out that psychologists have observed "that
people pay much more attention to vivid, concrete information than to more
colorless, abstract information," that we are more likely to notice something
"distinct within its environment," and that we are "influenced by the order in which
we learn[] different features."47
Kertzer puts all of this together and states that, as a psychological matter,
political rituals are "persuasive" because they "discourage critical thinking."4" He
asserts that "[a]s a form of formalized communication, [ritual] presents us with a
well-defined course of action... [and] highlights a limited series of vivid images...
[and] symbols employed [to] suggest a particular interpretation of what is being
viewed.49 In this way, political reality is defined by both ritual and beliefs that "are
subsequently reaffirmed through regular collective expression."50 Political rituals
"encourage certain interpretations of the world" primarily through "the powerful
emotions they trigger."'" Kertzer acknowledges, though, that the ultimate force of
political rituals comes from a combination of emotion and cognitive content, with
the most effective rituals involving a person's personality as a whole. 2
IH. THE PLEDGE AS SACRED POLITICAL RITUAL
A. An Exegesis of the Pledge, with Commentary
To analyze the Pledge of Allegiance as a sacred political ritual, I begin Part II
with an exegesis of the Pledge, followed by consideration of its setting and context.
I then consider the expressive functions of the Pledge in creating and supporting
political norms.
46 Id. at 79 (quoting RICHARD NISBET[ & LEE Ross, HUMAN INTERFERENCE: STRATEGIES
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 7 (1980)).
47 Id. at 82-83.
48 Id. at 85.
49 Id.
'o Id. at 95. As Kertzer points out, this view assumes that people are not essentially
rational. Id. at 96-97.
I' d. at 99.
52 Id. Along similar lines, Kertzer maintains that political rituals can be seen as "a form
of rhetoric, [or] the propagation of a message through a complex symbolic performance." Id.
at 101.
It is worth pointing out that, despite his emphasis on the construction of political reality
through political rituals and symbols, Kertzer sensibly repudiates the extreme view that
people are "zombies imprisoned in a symbolically created universe they are powerless to
change." Id. at 174. After all, he observes, people's behavior and their symbols do change
and "these changes are [often] linked to external events." Id. at 175. Kertzer devotes chapter
9 of his book to a discussion of how political change comes about. See id. at 174-84.
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"/': This personal pronoun is in the singular, not the plural. It is the indiviaua
who speaks here and takes personal responsibility in front of others, peers and
teacher, in the classroom. The individual engages in a performative act; the
rational faculty is involved, as is the affective (hand on the heart). "I am, therefore
I pledge." "I pledge, therefore I am."
"pledge allegiance": I promise loyalty and fidelity and affirm that this is the
truth (that it corresponds to fact). I do this in a public ceremony that others see and
in which they participate as well. Symbolically I bind myself (to the flag and the
Republic) at the same time that others similarly bind themselves. I communicate
this message to others and they communicate this message to me. All of us "I' s" wit-
ness together, thereby constituting a political community. Solidarity is promoted,
even if we have different political views.
Significantly, after the first three words of the Pledge are recited, the speaker
recedes into the background while the American flag, America's form of gov-
ernment, and its idealized characteristics become the focus and take center stage.
"to the flag of the United States of America": I pledge allegiance to a piece of
decorated cloth that represents or symbolizes the United States, and to no other
country or its flag. The American flag not only concretely embodies the political
community as it currently exists and as it will exist in the future, but it also
represents the history of the United States, from its founding to the present. This
real and imagined history includes those episodes in which the flag has played an
important role, such as the Revolutionary War, the British bombardment of Fort
McHenry during the War of 1812, the Civil War and the First and Second World
Wars (the latter, by Iwo Jima especially). By pledging allegiance to the American
flag, I am connected to the past, present, and future of the United States.
The American flag is thus a sacred political symbol,53 one whose integrity is
protected by federal and state statutes. While it is true that these statutes cannot,
consistent with the First Amendment, prevent the physical mutilation of the flag for
" See Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Sacred Flag and the First Amendment, 66 IND. L.J. 511
(1991), where I considered the implications of the various opinions in Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989), which held, five-four, that criminalizing the politically motivated burning
of the American flag violates the First Amendment. Id. at 513. I argued that, for the
dissenters, the American flag is a sacred object that must be venerated because of the role it
has played in American history and because it embodies the American experience. Id. at 530.
The flag also "represents America's imagined past and present." Id. As I pointed out in
connection with Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, veneration of the American flag "draws
citizens within the American experience, invites vicarious participation in the birth of the
republic and the various wars in which American blood was spilled in defense of that
republic, and thus promotes their attachment to it." Id. at 530-31. Nevertheless, despite the
importance of the flag for political community and American civil religion, I ultimately
concluded that sacralizing the flag by criminalizing its politically motivated burning is, on
balance, unwise in light of our First Amendment "tradition of tolerance for controversial and
unsettling ideas." Id. at 548.
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political purposes, they nevertheless express the reverent attitude that one is
supposed to display before this piece of decorated cloth. 4
"and to the Republic for which it stands": I pledge allegiance not only to the
flag, which represents the United States and its history, but also to its political
system. I acknowledge that the flag symbolizes a particular political system and
type of government. This political system is both an idea (a Republic, neither a true
democracy on the one hand nor an authoritarian regime on the other) and a concrete
government in the real world. The Republic, like the flag, has a past, present, and
future, and I am thereby connected to them as well.
The remainder of the Pledge is more abstract than what precedes it because it
asserts the idealized characteristics of the Republic. This abstraction encourages
people with markedly different political views to join in the Pledge and reinforces
the various myths that follow.
"one Nation under God' (the language discussed in Newdow): This people and
its political community (a Republic) recognize God as the Supreme Being. The
Nation and its citizens live by God's laws and under God's protection. God, the
foundation of the nation, intervenes in history and is concerned with the United
States. The absence of a comma between "one Nation" and "under God" further
emphasizes that God is foundational.
This myth serves both to reassure and to connect the individual to the political
community that is thus rendered eternal and transcendent. In addition, it sacralizes
the United States as a nation, and further suggests that the same God who created
the world and revealed himself in the Jewish and Christian traditions plays an
important role in United States history. Moreover, this reference to God who is
eternal means that members of the American political community are connected
through God to the omnipotent and the omnipresent. The phrase thus turns what
was already a powerful political ritual into an explicitly sacred political ritual.
While inconsistent with a strict church/state separation approach of the sort
advocated by John Locke55 and Thomas Jefferson,56 "under God" is consistent with
civic republicanism of the kind espoused by George Washington.57 He and others,
14 Id. at 516 n.30.
" See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1695), reprinted in 35 GREAT BOOKS
OF THE WESTERN WORLD: LocKE, BERKELEY, HUME 1, 4 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed.,
1952) (arguing the Enlightenment position of strict separation of church and state, "civil
government relates only to men's civil interests, is confined to the care of the things of this
world, and hath nothing to do with the world to come").
56 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan.
1, 1802), reprinted in 8 THE WRrrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H.A. Washington ed.,
1984) (interpreting the Establishment and Free Exercises Clauses as "building a wall of
separation between church and State").
" See GEORGE WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF
THE UNrrED STATES (1796), S. Doc. No. 106-21, at 20 (2000) (declaring that religion and
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such as John Adams, maintained that the future of the United States dependea on
the morality of its people, and that, in turn, this morality depended on religion.58 In
this way religion is useful to the political community. Accordingly, they (unlike
Jefferson and perhaps Madison) would have had little or no problem with incor-
porating God in the Pledge. From this perspective, the inclusion of God in the
Pledge is an entirely proper manifestation of American civil religion.
Observe how "one Nation under God" relates back to the first words of the
Pledge: the individual who is pledging allegiance personally acknowledges God's
involvement in the founding of the United States and God's continuing interest in,
and protection of, the country and its citizens.
"indivisible": This is the myth that the citizens of the United States are politi-
cally united and cannot be divided; they constitute one entity. The fact that students
recite the Pledge in unison and simultaneously engage in the same conduct (like
their parents before them) buttresses the myth of indivisibility. Moreover, there is
an intriguing parallel between an indivisible nation and a monotheistic God.
"with liberty and justice for all": These words, which are undefined and vague,
declare the myth that the United States provides freedom and fairness to everyone,
regardless of who they are and where they come from. There is no express refer-
ence to equality, but it is connoted by "for all."
B. The Setting and Context of the Pledge59
1. Where and Who
The Pledge ordinarily occurs in the classroom at the beginning of the school day
and involves standing up and pledging to the flag while reciting the words of the
Pledge. The school classroom, a special purpose space that is educational in nature,
is used not only to convey the information and skills necessary for success in the
workplace but also to inculcate democratic values and to create a sense of connec-
tion to the larger political community.60 The classroom is under the control of an
morality are essential to the success of popular government and "that morality can[not] be
maintained without religion"). For an illuminating discussion of various theological and
political perspectives on the proper relation between government and religion, including the
Enlightenment view of Locke and Jefferson and the civic republican view of Washington and
others, see John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371 (1996).
" See WASHINGTON, supra note 57.
'9 Recall that I use Kertzer's definition of ritual "as symbolic behavior that is socially
standardized and repetitive." KERTZER, supra note 8, at 9. Setting and context are therefore
important. See e.g., BELL, supra note 14, at 1-2 (mentioning Bell's approach to the study of
ritual).
60 See Witte, supra note 57, at 424 (describing the primary purpose of public schools as
advancing "constitutional and democratic values").
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authority figure, the teacher who, representing the state,6' leads the students in the
Pledge, thereby strengthening the message of the Pledge. The students are all to-
gether when they recite the Pledge in unison under the teacher's leadership, thereby
promoting social and political solidarity. These considerations combine to enhance
whatever educational and political message the Pledge is thought to communicate,
even if that message is received differently by students of different ages and at dif-
ferent levels of intellectual development.62 Further reinforcing social and political
solidarity as well as the Pledge's message is that most, if not all, of the parents of
the students themselves participated in the Pledge when they were in school.
2. When
The Pledge routinely takes place at the same time every day, ordinarily at the
very beginning of the school day. This placement at the beginning of the day has
several effects. Because the Pledge precedes instruction, it can be interpreted as
setting a patriotic tone for the school day. In addition, this placement gives it a kind
of priority over the rest of the curriculum. And the fact that the Pledge remains the
same each day, while the instruction changes, both solemnizes the educational
enterprise in a prayer-like manner and transcends the daily instruction. That the
Pledge is recited in the classroom each and every day further emphasizes its
message.
3. The Physical Movements
It is not only the recitation of the words while respectfully standing at attention
that gives the Pledge its affective power. Consider that there is movement of the
right hand to the heart and the holding of the hand over the heart, the seat of
emotions, while reciting. This constitutes more than words that are a performative
61 In private religious schools, the teacher typically represents the church or other
religious institution.
62 See Eugene A. Weinstein, Development of the Concept of Flag and the Sense of
National Identity, 28 CHID DEV. 167 (1957). The study concluded that the acquisition of the
concept of the flag and national identity is gradual and is related to chronological age and the
ability to perform logical operations. Id. at 173-74. For example, children at the first stage
of development, from five to six years old, only know that the thing called a flag has certain
colors and lines but have no real idea of what the flag represents or that there are other
countries. Id. at 171. In contrast, children at the eighth stage of development, ten years old,
know that "the flag stands for loyalty to a set of goals" as well as to "those groups holding
those goals." Id. at 172. They also know of other countries and other flags. Id. at 173. Finally,
children at the ninth and tenth stages studied, from eleven to twelve years old, "clearly
understand[] the full implication of convention and [are] able to incorporate this
understanding in responses showing a sophisticated conception of the relationship of
convention to flag, people, and government." Id.
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act; this is itself an act (symbolic conduct) that communicates to others (a kina or
witnessing) the speaker's belief in what he or she is saying. Furthermore, that the
students are not only saying the same thing but also acting in the same manner
promotes conformity of both belief and action.
C. The Expressive Functions of the Pledge
The power of the Pledge as a sacred political ritual is not diminished by the
First Amendment right of children to refuse to participate, per Barnette,63 because
students overwhelmingly do participate. It takes a great deal of courage for a
student (or anyone, for that matter) to separate from peers and thereby call attention
to herself. In effect, the student must publicly declare herself in disagreement with
some aspect of the Pledge. 4
But there is another reason the sacralizing power of the Pledge is not
diminished. Apart from whatever informal sanctions might be imposed on a student
who refuses to salute and pledge to the flag, the legislatively mandated Pledge
communicates an important message. One does not have to commit fully to what
legal scholars currently call expressivist theory6" to agree that laws send messages
in addition to creating sanctions for misbehavior.6 6 These messages, which involve
certain attitudes, beliefs, and values that are communicated by a legislature and are
understood as such by the audience, can function to manage social norms and
63 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
4 See KERTZER, supra note 8, at 167. Kertzer observes that the Nazis used a person's
refusal to salute "Heil Hitler" as a means of identifying opponents, who were then ostracized
or worse. Id.
65 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503 (2000); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal
Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REv. 339 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2045 (1996). In part, expressivist theories of law
have developed in reaction to the law and economics movement that emphasizes the effect
of government sanctions, while supposedly paying little or no attention to the messages that
legal rules send or to the effect of those messages on social norms and behavior.
Expressivist theory can be insightful, but the core observation that legal rules send
messages even apart from their sanctions is nothing new. For example, in the infamous
Supreme Court decision, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which upheld a state
statute prohibiting whites and blacks from traveling together on the same railroad car, the
majority argued that this kind of segregation did not "stamp[] the colored race with a badge
of inferiority." Id. at 551. If that were the case, it was only because "the colored race chooses
to put that construction upon it." Id. To which Justice Harlan, in his justly famous dissent,
soundly responded that "[e]very one knows" that the purpose of the legislation was to
exclude blacks from railroad cars used by whites and thus to send a message of inferiority.
Id. at 557.
66 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 953
(1996).
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influence behavior by signaling the underlying attitudes of the community and
society (as reflected by a legislative majority) toward various kinds of behavior.
The assumption underlying this particular expressivist approach is that as people
get information about what others - presumably the majority - approve and
disapprove, they modify their behavior in order to "gain approval and avoid
disapproval. 6 7 In the case of the legislatively mandated Pledge, the audience
consists of all members of the political community as well as students.
One critical implication of this approach is that even purely symbolic
government action is important and can be controversial because it can change
behavior by signaling majoritarian attitudes. This helps explain why there have
been so many political and legal struggles not only about governmental displays of
religious symbols such as creches, Christmas trees, and menorahs, but also about
governmental attempts to protect the American flag and to promote the Pledge with
"under God."
It should therefore come as no surprise that there was such a striking and
strident reaction to the Ninth Circuit's initially broad decision in Newdow. People
understood this decision as taking a stand against the desirability of the Pledge and
thus against its overt sacralizing message.6" Responding to Newdow, many
symbolically expressed their own belief in the message of the Pledge. This was
perhaps most obvious when members of Congress in Washington reacted to
Newdow by standing on the steps of the Capitol and reciting the Pledge.69 This
ritual-reinforcing response was intended to send its own message - the "one
Nation under God" message of the Pledge - to the national political community.
With this understanding of the Pledge as a sacred political ritual, I turn next to
the constitutional background of the Pledge and then to the decision in Newdow and
the Establishment Clause issues presented.
67 See McAdams, supra note 65, at 340.
68 Strictly speaking, when the Supreme Court strikes down legislation as violative of the
Constitution, it is not taking a position on the wisdom of that legislation, a matter for the
legislative process in a democracy. But very often the public considers judicial review for
constitutionality as indeed taking a position on the wisdom of the reviewed legislation. This
attitude is, at least in part, a consequence of the public's view of the Constitution as a sacred
founding document that expresses constitutional norms that bind the entire political
community. It is easy to move from this to the view that if legislation is struck down by the
Supreme Court on constitutional grounds, then it is unwise as well. In contrast, if legislation
is upheld by the Court against constitutional challenge, then it may be considered wise. As
a result, the Court's constitutional decisions can be, and often are, received expressively even
though they are not the outcome of majoritarian decision making. The Court's abortion
decisions are perhaps the most obvious example, although the flag-buming decision is
another example of a case in which the Court is often perceived as taking sides on the
legislative merits of a controversial issue.
69 Senators Call Pledge Decision "Stupid" (June 27, 2002), at http://archives.cnn.con/
2002/ALLPOLITICS/06/26/senate.resolution.pledge/.
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IfI. THE PLEDGE (WITHOUT GOD), WEST VIRGINIA BOARD OF EDUCATION V.
BARNETTE AND THE COURT'S SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS
A. The Pledge and Compelled Speech
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette" contains some of the most
famous language in the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, namely,
Justice Jackson's observation that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."'" Most everyone also knows
that, in overruling the two-year-old Gobitis7 2 decision, the Court, in the midst of the
Second World War, held in Barnette that it violates the First Amendment for the
state to compel public school students to recite the Pledge and salute the flag. 3
Still, certain aspects of this decision deserve mention.
Barnette dealt with a compulsory Pledge and flag salute74 that was challenged
by Jehovah's Witnesses on freedom of speech and religion grounds. Jehovah's
Witnesses parents (who were prosecuted or threatened with prosecution) and their
children (who were expelled or threatened with expulsion) maintained that the
compulsory flag salute was inconsistent with the Bible which prohibited making,
bowing down to, or serving any graven image.75 Although the opinion spoke a bit
about religion, the Court ruled for the challengers primarily on free speech grounds.
The Court focused on the fact that forcing children to recite the Pledge and salute
the flag constituted compelled speech that was forbidden by the First Amendment.76
According to the Court, this rationale covered both the Pledge, insofar as oral speech
was compelled, and the salute, insofar as expressive conduct was compelled.77 The
Court rejected the argument that the educational functions of the compulsory Pledge
and flag salute trumped the relevant First Amendment considerations.7"
70 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
7, Id. at 642.
72 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
7' Bamette, 319 U.S. at 642.
" Barnette is not as clear as it should be about the nature of the salute itself. The school
board resolution describes the Pledge as including a salute defined as placing the right hand
on the breast, id. at 626-28 n.2, while the Court's opinion refers to the required salute as the
"stiff-arm" salute with the saluter keeping the right hand raised with palm turned up so as to
distinguish it from the Nazi salute, id. at 628. For the purposes of this Article, it makes no
difference.
71 Id. at 629-30.
76 Id. at 631.
77 Id. at 632-33.
71 Id. at 633-34.
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Barnette did not question the constitutionality of the Pledge itself which, at the
time, did not contain "one Nation under God." 79 Indeed, such a challenge on either
Establishment Clause grounds or free speech grounds surely would have been
rejected because the Pledge was not a prayer but was rather a legitimate part of the
educational process for teaching patriotism." Instead, what Barnette declared was
that because of the Pledge's compulsory nature and the Free Speech Clause,
students, whether Jehovah's Witnesses or not, must be permitted to opt-out of the
Pledge.8 However, after Barnette, schools could still offer this patriotic ritual in
the classroom as part of the curriculum. Further, schools could still teach everyone,
including students who were Jehovah's Witnesses, about the Pledge and about
patriotism in general in an attempt to inculcate certain political values.82 The crux
of the constitutional problem was the schools' attempt to force students, through
threat of punishment, to affirm political beliefs and values.
B. School Prayer and the Establishment Clause
In light of the Congressional insertion in 1954 of "under God" in the Pledge, the
Court's approach to school prayer should be considered.83
Simply put, school prayer led by a teacher under state auspices in the classroom
violates the Establishment Clause. This has been black-letter law since the early
1960's when the Court handed down Engel v. Vitale8 4 and Abington School District
v. Schempp.85 Various attempts to circumvent these rulings, such as by the impo-
sition of a one-minute period of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer," have
79 Id. at 642.
80 Id. at 625-26.
81 Id. at 641-42.
82 The interesting argument has been made that the Pledge may be unconstitutional under
the Free Speech Clause, even without "under God," on the ground that there is psychological
coercion of the sort found by the Court in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), a case
involving a school-authorized Rabbi-led prayer at a "voluntary" middle school graduation
ceremony. See Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
451 (1995). There are threads of this position contained in Justice Thomas's Newdow opinion
in which he concurs in the judgment and argues that Lee v. Weisman went much too far in
its coercion rationale. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004),
2327 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In my view, Lee adopted an expansive definition of
'coercion' that cannot be defended however one decides the 'difficult question' of '[w]hether
and how th[e Establishment] Clause should constrain state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment."') (citation omitted).
83 My purpose here is obviously not to reprise all of the Court's Establishment Clause
doctrine, but, for background purposes, very briefly to consider that doctrine as related to
school prayer.
84 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
85 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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been rather firmly rebuffed.86 Such cases clearly violate the first prong of the
Lemon test, the requirement that a statute have a secular legislative purpose.87
Somewhat more difficult issues have arisen in connection with the inclusion of
religious "invocations" at public schools' graduation ceremonies 8 and football
games.89 However, in these cases as well, the Court has found violations of the
Establishment Clause on the ground that the governmentally authorized delivery of
a religious invocation would coerce those students who were either compelled, or
who felt social pressure, to attend these activities.9"
How, then, to approach the 1954 inclusion of "one Nation under God" in the
Pledge? The issue is not whether a student can be compelled to recite the Pledge,
as that question was resolved long ago in Barnette on compelled speech grounds.
Rather, the question is whether the state can even authorize the recitation of the
Pledge. Is the Pledge, because of "one Nation under God," the functional equiv-
alent of a prayer and thus violative of the Establishment Clause? This is the question
that the Newdow court answered in the affirmative, at first broadly and then later
more narrowly as applied to the public schools.
86 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 38 (1985) (internal quotations omitted).
87 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Arising in the context of public financial
support for private schools, the test has three parts: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally the statute must not foster excessive government entanglement
with religion." Id. at 612-13 (citations and quotations omitted). Although this test has been
extensively and repeatedly criticized by the current Court, it has never been formally repu-
diated; however, the third part was effectively eliminated in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997), and folded into the second "effects" part. See id. at 223.
88 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 577.
89 See Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
9 In Lee, 505 U.S. 577, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, used the coercion test to
invalidate the school-authorized religious invocation at a graduation ceremony. Id. at 595.
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy, unlike Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
Thomas, did not join in the debate on the merits when the Court reversed Newdow on stand-
ing grounds. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2305 (2004).
A third Establishment Clause test, endorsement, was initially articulated by Justice
O'Connor, concurring in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), where the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a city's Christmas display in a privately owned park "in the heart of
the city's shopping district." Id. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In her opinion concurring
in the judgment in Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2301, 2312, Justice O'Connor applied the
endorsement test and found that the Establishment Clause was not violated. Id. at 2321-26
(O'Connor, J., concurring). In addition, she argued that "under God" similarly passed the
coercion test. Id. at 2326-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring). As discussed next, each of the
three Establishment Clause tests - Lemon, endorsement, and coercion - were applied by
the Ninth Circuit in Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), with the last
playing a particularly significant role in the Ninth Circuit's amended opinion in Newdow, 328
F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003).
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TV. THE SACRALIZED PLEDGE (WITH GOD) AND
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S NEWDOW DECISION
A. The Newdow Decision
The plaintiff in Newdow was an atheist whose daughter attended a public school
where the teachers, pursuant to state law and school district rule, began each day
by leading students in a recitation of the Pledge.9' The Pledge satisfied a state
requirement that public schools begin each day with an "appropriate patriotic
exercise. '"92 The plaintiff Newdow claimed that his daughter was injured when
she was required to watch and listen while her classmates were led in a "ritual
proclaiming that there is a God, and that our's [sic] is 'one nation under God."' 9 3
Reversing the district court, which had granted the school district defendants'
motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit first found that the plaintiff had standing "to
challenge a practice that interfere[d] with his right to direct the religious education
of his daughter,, 94 specifically the Pledge as amended in 1954 to include "one
Nation under God." 95 According to the court, the 1954 amendment was intended
by Congress to result in the daily recitation of these words in school classrooms
across the country.
96
Next, the Ninth Circuit addressed the Establishment Clause issues raised by the
Pledge.97 It initially ruled that the Establishment Clause was violated under each
of the three tests set out by the Supreme Court,98 but it subsequently amended its
9' Newdow, 292 F.3d at 600. The defendants were the United States Congress, President
Clinton, the state of California and various others, including the school district and several
officials. Id. at 597.
92 id. at 600.
9' id. at 601.
9' id. at 602.
9' Id. at 602--05.
96 Id. at 605.
97 Id. at 605-11.
9' ld. at 611. In its first opinion, though, the Ninth Circuit determined that the Pledge
violated the endorsement test because it was the profession of a religious belief in mono-
theism. Id. at 607. The court explained:
The text of the official Pledge, codified in federal law, impermissibly
takes a position with respect to the purely religious question of the
existence and identity of God. A profession that we are a nation "under
God" is identical, for Establishment Clause purposes, to a profession
that we are a nation "under Jesus," a nation "under Vishnu," a nation
"under Zeus," or a nation "under no god," because none of these
professions can be neutral with respect to religion.
Id. at 607-08. The court further asserted that the Pledge impermissibly sent "a message to
unbelievers 'that they [were] outsiders, not full members of the political community."' Id.
at 608.
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opinion by limiting it to the coercion test and thereby to the public schools. But in
that portion of its initial opinion which still remained the law in the Ninth Circuit-
until the Supreme Court reversed on prudential standing grounds - the court found
the Pledge violated the coercion test because it placed students in what the court
described as "the untenable position of choosing between participating in an
exercise with religious content or protesting."99 This was especially the case here
because the students were young and impressionable and were inclined to follow
"the norms set by their school, their teacher and their fellow students."l 0 The Ninth
Circuit emphasized the coercive effect of the Pledge by quoting President
Eisenhower who, at the amendment's signing, declared: "From this day forward, the
millions of our school children will daily proclaim in every city and town, every
village and rural schoolhouse, the dedication of our Nation and our people to the
Almighty."'0 '
It also ruled that the Pledge failed the Lemon test as well. Id. at 611. The court had little
doubt that the words "one Nation under God" were intended to advance religion. Id. at 610.
In this connection, the court rejected the argument that the Pledge must be considered as a
whole and that, when so considered, it had the secular purpose of "solemnizing public
occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is
worthy of appreciation in society." Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693). To the contrary, the
Ninth Circuit responded that it was not the Pledge as a whole that was challenged but rather
the 1954 amendment alone, and its sole purpose was "to advance religion in order to
differentiate the United States from nations under communist rule." Id. (quoting the
legislative history which contained, among other things, the following: "The inclusion of
God in our pledge.., would further acknowledge the dependence of our people and our
Government upon the moral directions of the Creator. At the same time it would serve to
deny the atheistic and materialistic concepts of communism with its attendant subservience
of the individual." H.R. Rep. No. 83-1693, at 1-2 (1954)). Furthermore, even though the
school district policy as to the Pledge (in contrast to the policy of Congress) had a secular
purpose, namely, the promotion of patriotism, the policy failed the second part of the Lemon
test because it was highly likely to convey to young and impressionable students a message
of endorsement of beliefs regarding a monotheistic God. Id. at 611. The Ninth Circuit
concluded by observing that the Supreme Court had not dealt with the Establishment Clause
issue raised by the Pledge and that various Justices' dicta suggesting that the Pledge was
constitutional should not be considered dispositive. Id. at 611-12 n. 12. It also criticized the
analysis of a contrary Seventh Circuit decision, Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 980
F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992). Id.
99 Id. at 608.
o See id. at 609.
' Id. at 609 (quoting 100 CONG. REC. 8618 (1954)). Judge Fernandez dissented on the
Establishment Clause issue in an interesting opinion. Id. at 612-15. He did not argue, as
others have done, that the Pledge, even with "one Nation under God," was "ceremonial
deism" with no real religious meaning. Id. at 614. Indeed, he specifically rejected that
"euphemism." Id. Instead, after commenting that the Establishment Clause primarily
mandated neutrality, he argued that "the danger that 'under God' in our Pledge of Allegiance
will tend to bring about a theocracy or suppress somebody's beliefs is so minuscule as to be
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Thereafter, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, reversed and
held in a five-three decision (Justice Scalia had recused himself) that the plaintiff
did not have prudential standing. 2 The majority did not address the merits; how-
ever, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor and in part by Justice
Thomas, concurred in the judgment, declaring that the plaintiff had prudential
standing and arguing on the merits that the phrase "under God" was essentially "a
declaration of belief in allegiance and loyalty to the United States flag and the
Republic that it represents" and was "in no sense a prayer, nor an endorsement of
any religion."' 0
3
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, maintaining that under the
endorsement test she had regularly applied, the phrase "under God" did not violate
the Establishment Clause because it constituted an example of "ceremonial
deism.""°' She also argued that the result would be the same even if she were to apply
the coercion test.0 5 Justice Thomas also concurred inthejudgment, contending that
under the Court's precedents, including its wrongly decided coercion decision in
Lee v. Weisman, the phrase was probably unconstitutional.'0 6 However, he went on
to argue that the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence should be reexam-
ined, particularly that dealing with incorporation, and that so reexamined, the
Establishment Clause was not violated by the phrase "under God."'0 7
B. Newdow Evaluated
A powerful argument can be made that the Ninth Circuit got it right on the
Establishment Clause merits both initially and especially after amending to rely
solely on the coercion test as applied to public schools. While the primary purpose
of the Pledge is essentially secular in nature - the fostering of patriotism - the
reference to "one Nation under God" introduces a clearly religious element. It will
not do to characterize this as de minimis,'0 8 as Judge Fernandez did in his dissent,
de minimis. The danger that phrase presents to our First Amendment freedoms is picayune
at most." Id. at 613. For this reason, there was no Establishment Clause violation. Judge
Fernandez's dissent essentially remained unchanged even though the Ninth Circuit amended
its initial opinion. See Newdow, 328 F.3d at 490-93 (Fernandez, J., concurring and
dissenting). Note that Justice O'Connor in her Newdow opinion expressly rejected the view
that there were de minimis constitutional violations. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2323 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
102 Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2312.
103 Id. at 2319-20.
'04 Id. at 2323.
loS Id. at 2326-27.
106 Id. at 2330.
107 Id. at 2330-31.
loS See Steven G. Gey, "Under God, " The Pledge ofAllegiance, and Other Constitutional
Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1865 (2003) (arguing that the Establishment Clause claim in
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because the Pledge is recited daily by millions of school children in the classroom
and the intended and actual impact of this sacred political ritual is significant. 19
Furthermore, describing the Pledge as "ceremonial deism" is similarly un-
persuasive, even though Justice O'Connor in her Newdow concurring opinion took
this position.'" If ceremonial deism is thought of as referring to God in the truly
deistic sense of a non-revealed God who does not intervene in history but is rather
"nature's God" or the Aristotlean first cause, then "under God" does not qualify.
The Pledge strongly and theistically implies (as its legislative history indicates) that
God is on the side of the United States and that the government and people of the
United States live by God's law."'
Alternatively, if ceremonial deism is thought of as referring to God almost in
passing, absent-mindedly and by rote, so that the reference to God in the Pledge
is not sacralizing, then "under God" still does not pass muster. The Pledge places
God immediately after the Nation (without even a comma) and uses God to ground,
and to provide a religious charge to, the national political community. God is thus
an integral element of the Pledge as presently constituted. 12 Without a comma
between "one Nation" and "under God" but with a comma after "God," the
remainder of the Pledge ("indivisible, with liberty and justice for all") modifies
"one Nation under God." This implies that the central characteristic of the political
community is that it is "under God," with the remainder of the Pledge being
secondary. In contrast, if there had been a comma after "Nation," then "under God"
would have been one of the characteristics of the political community, and the
other characteristics, "indivisible" and "with liberty andjustice for all," would have
as much weight.
It is also relevant to the Establishment Clause merits that the Pledge is recited
in a compulsory education setting involving young and impressionable children. 113
One of the advantages of the coercion test is that it takes express account of the
setting in which the alleged Establishment Clause violation occurs. The result is
that while the Pledge may violate the Establishment Clause in a compulsory public
Newdow is far from trivial). Also, as noted earlier, Justice O'Connor expressly rejected the
position that constitutional violations could be de minimis. 124 S. Ct. at 2323 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
"o9 Newdow, 124 S.Ct. at 1870-71.
" Id. at 2323 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"' See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2123 (1996).
112 See supra Part II.A. Therefore, I disagree with Justice O'Connor's view that the Pledge
has minimal religious content because the phrase "under God" is only two of thirty-one
words and "the presence of those words is not absolutely essential to the Pledge, as
demonstrated by the fact that it existed without them for over 50 years." Newdow, 124 S. Ct.
at 2326 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
" See Epstein, supra note 111, at 2120-21.
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school setting," 4 it does not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause, for
example, to open official government proceedings with the Pledge since adults
would constitute the participants and audience. For the same reason it does not
necessarily violate the Establishment Clause to sing "God Bless America" at official
government functions." 5 Indeed, such considerations likely induced the Ninth
Circuit to rely solely on the coercion test in its amended opinion and thereby limit
its decision to the public schools.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's amended decision correctly resolved the Establishment
Clause issue.
CONCLUSION
American civil religion," 6 whose roots, according to W. Lance Bennett, "can
be traced to the religious mythology of colonial America,"'" 7 continues to be
grounded on myth. But it is also perpetuated by political rituals which are the
acting out of principles that "reinforce the political order, reify belief in the
regime's capacity to handle problems, and integrate citizens into the political
culture in the most meaningful of ways.""' One of these important political rituals
is the sacralized Pledge of Allegiance, a ritual made more significant because it is
required by law and has been recited daily by elementary and secondary school
students (and their parents and grandparents) for decades. The Pledge was a
powerful political ritual even before "under God" was added by Congress in 1954,
but the two words (the twenty-third and twenty-fourth of the thirty-one word
Pledge) explicitly made it sacred. Indeed, the furor followingNewdow suggests that
"under God" provides a significant patriotic effect. At the same time, these two
words were the reason that Newdow found a violation of the Establishment Clause.
There is no gainsaying the importance of teaching students, our future citizens,
about patriotism and political community. The Pledge, as a sacred political ritual,
probably does a decent job of inculcating and promoting such values. In addition,
the government sends an important message of patriotism and solidarity to the
114 Recall that Justice Thomas argues that Lee, which was grounded on coercion, was
wrongly decided. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2327-30 (Thomas, J., concurring).
115 This point might be made in terms of the Lemon and endorsement tests as well. Thus,
the Pledge flunks the "effects" part of the Lemon test in a compulsory public school setting
but not when it opens an official government proceeding. Similarly, the Pledge constitutes
much more of an endorsement of religion in a compulsory public school setting than when
it opens an official government proceeding. Therefore, Justice O'Connor unsuccessfully
strains to find "under God" constitutional under the endorsement test. See id. at 2321-27.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
116 See Bennett, supra note 41, at 79.
... Id. at 85.
118 Id. at 91.
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entire political community when it requires the recitation of the Pledge, parucu-
larly because the Pledge renders God foundational. This message of patriotism
and solidarity may be of even greater import now after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.
Nevertheless, the Pledge, an important component of American civil religion,
functioned as a powerful political ritual for decades before "under God" was
inserted. Without an expressly religious reference, it promoted solidarity, en-
couraged political community, and connected the individual to the history, myths,
and transcendent values of the United States. It would still do so in the public
schools even if, by virtue of the Establishment Clause, God were removed and the
Pledge desacralized.
